Issues in Religion and Psychotherapy
Volume 15

Number 2

Article 9

4-1-1990

Beliefs of a Mormon Clinical Psychologist
Robert J. Howell

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/irp

Recommended Citation
Howell, Robert J. (1990) "Beliefs of a Mormon Clinical Psychologist," Issues in Religion and
Psychotherapy: Vol. 15 : No. 2 , Article 9.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/irp/vol15/iss2/9

This Article or Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Issues in Religion and Psychotherapy by an authorized editor of BYU
ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Beliefs of a Mormon
Clinical Psychologist

Robert

J.

Howell, PhD

n addressing the issue of developing my own identity as a
therapist, my vantage point is that of a clinical psychologist. To
narrow this field a bit, it should be noted that most of my work
has been in the field of psychopathology and forensic psychology.
Because of this orientation, I like to view the mental health field as
one which deals with various types of mental illnesses. And
psychotherapy as one of the modes of treatment for some mental
disorders.

I

Ideally it would be helpful to have a broad overarching theory
which would guide the whole field of mental illness. This was the
attempt of Freud's psychoanalytic theory and some of the offshoots
and variants of Freud's theory. To reiterate what is likely so well
known it need not be restated, a theory should never be judged by
its ultimate truth or falsity. Rather, it should be judged by its
utility or usefulness. Thus, psychoanalytic theory has shown to be
very useful in conversion disorders and in many of the dissociative
disorders. It is of no value to organic-mental disorders or substance-use disorders and of little value to schizophrenic disorders or
mood disorders.
Unfortunately, it seems to be the lot of the behavior sciences
not to have any theories in the classical use of the term theory.
The best the behavior sciences seem to be able to do are to utilize
specific models for specific areas of study. But there has been little
success in bridging any model, or combination of models into an
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overarching theory. Indeed, the only conceptualizations in the
biological and behavior sciences field that reaches the status of a
theory, as I am using the term, is that of the theory of evolution.
As indicated, a theory should not be judged by its ultimate truth
or falsity but rather by its usefulness. The usefulness of evolution
is beyond debate. All plants and animals are classified following
the phylogenetic scale, hence the result of the theory of evolution.
In the health field, one notes the development, first on lower
animals, of the polio vaccine. The Rh blood typing was first done
on lower animals. Many practice surgeries have been and continue
to be performed on lower animals because of the similarities
between lower animals and humans. Finally, in psychology, and
specifically the field of learning, drug dependency, and brain
damage, many findings have first been demonstrated in lower
animals. All this points to the utility of the theory of evolution in
the biological and behavioral sciences. Interestingly, the steps from
subhumans to Homo sapiens is in trouble. There doesn't seem to
be the smooth continuity, but this doesn't detract appreciably from
the usefulness of the theory of evolution.
But, as indicated, in psychology the best that we have been able
to do is to construct small models for specific ideas. This is also
true of the field of mental health and mental illness. As previously
stated, psychoanalytic theory is very useful in some mental disorders
but of little value in others.
Over the years, I have come to an increasingly firm conviction
that the only way progress is going to be made in dealing with the
mental disorders is to consider mental disorders as discrete and
specific illnesses with a different cause for each disorder. Some of
the causes will be biological in nature. Some causes will be
psychological in nature and some will have their roots in the family
and other social entities.
It seems to me that the proper approach in treating a mental
illness is very much analogous to that of any other kind of illness.
That is, first a diagnosis should be made. The diagnosis hopefully
will lead to the cause or the etiology of the illness. Then treatment
should be based on this diagnosis and etiology. Thus, I believe, as
indicated by Bergin and Strupp (1972, p. 8), that there should be
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specific therapeutic interventions which produce specific changes in
specific patients under specific conditions. The specific treatments
should be based on the specific cause of the illness and this
treatment should produce specific outcomes. Obviously, these
outcomes should be measurable.
While such a model may seem best suited for biological
treatments, I state again that just as I believe in biological germs so
I believe in psychological germs and family and social germs as
well. The treatment of choice for conversion disorders and
dissociative disorders is psychodynamic therapy. In contrast the
treatment of choice for bipolar mood disorders is chemotherapy
and the treatment of choice for schizophrenic disorders is chemotherapy plus family therapy.
Much has been written about values in psychotherapy and
whether values should be expressed by the therapist or not. Psychoanalytic therapy would have the therapist be as an opaque
screen upon which the patient can impute his or her thoughts and
feelings as contrasted to reality therapy where the beliefs and values
of the therapist become quickly apparent. Whatever the therapist's
belief happens to be on this question of values, it is certain that the
therapist should be sensitive to the values of the patient. As long as
the values of the patient do not contain germs of psychopathology,
the therapist should cherish the patient's values and try not to
disturb them.
In contrast, however, if pathology is enmeshed in values, then
it is the obligation of the therapist to determine if potential costs
or hurt to the patient is outweighed by the potential benefit to the
patient by the therapist delving into these pathological patterns. If
it seems that there is little chance of altering the pathological
attitudes or behavior, or if it seems that the costs will outweigh the
benefits of trying to modifY these psychological behaviors, then it
should be the obligation of the therapist to leave these behavior
patterns or beliefs alone.
It is not likely that a therapist will alter the compulsive and
meticulous behavior of an obsessive compulsive personality disorder
(as opposed to an obsessive compulsive neurosis). If this is so, the
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therapist would do well to leave such meticulous behaviors of the
patient alone, or at very most, only try to make the behaviors a bit
more tolerable for people around the patient.

It also follows that if there is pathology in a person's religious
beliefs, it may be important to try to delicately undo this pathology
and help the person have healthier attitudes and beliefs. Again, this
should be attempted only so long as the potential benefits to be
gained by trying to intervene, outweigh the possible damage or cost
to the patient. If, for example, a patient's evangelical religious
beliefs and behaviors serve an important need in that person's life,
it would likely be damaging to the individual to try to get him or
her to give up such beliefs and attitudes.
Therapists should always be sensitive to their role as a therapist
and the limits of their role. It is important to realize that potential
harm can come when a therapist crosses the line and attempts to
become a personal friend, a religious counselor, or attempts to
assume other roles which are beyond the realm of the therapist. It
is almost axiomatic today that a grieving widow can be helped in
many ways a therapist can never help, by another widow, or a
group of widows, who have already experienced this tragic event.
Similarly, a bishop or a minister can do things with and for a
person that a therapist can never do. Conversely, there are things
that a therapist can do which would be inappropriate for a minister
or a bishop to attempt to do.
It is good practice for a therapist to involve the patient's church
leader at the proper time, if this a relevant issue. In a similar
manner it is important to involve self-help groups for the person or
other community support systems. One patient who had experienced a very tragic event in her life, perhaps received more help
from her LDS friends who included her in all their church and
social activities-more help than any medication or therapists could
have hoped to have done.
In conclusion, the role of the therapist should be contained
within well-defined boundaries. The therapist should use the kind
of therapy and make interventions which have good empirical
support for the kind of disorder which the patient manifests.
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Finally, the therapist should stay within the recognized bounds of
his or her profession and not intrude into other areas.

Robert J Howell is professor ofPsychology at Brigham Young
University
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